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09.05.07
Historical review of the Cyprus problem by
com. Andros Kyprianou, Member of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of AKEL
Brussels 9th May 2007-05-04
On behalf of
the Central Committee of AKEL I would like to warmly thank the Confederal
Group of the United European Left - Nordic Green Left for the
co-organisation together with us of this meeting on the Cyprus problem. I
especially want to thank the President of the Group Francis Wurtz for his
constant and unfaltering interest for the solution of the Cyprus problem. I
would also like to thank the Vice-President of the Group Gabi Zimmer who
accepted our invitation and is one of the speakers at our meeting.
I would also
like to address warm thanks to Mehmet Seyis, the Turkish Cypriot trade union
leader who is with us here today as a speaker in the discussion. As AKEL we
consider that the cooperation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots is the
corner-stone of the effort for an agreed solution to the Cyprus problem. The
progressive people in both communities must unite their forces and work
towards the achievement of a solution that will be acceptable to the
majority in both communities.
AKEL and RTP
(Republican Turkish Party) must constitute the axis of this effort. Without
any dogmatic approaches, keeping faith in principles, as they are defined by
the relative resolutions of the United Nations, International and European
law, we must lead the way so that the deadlock which exists currently can be
broken and a substantial dialogue can begin aiming to reach a solution as
soon as possible.
Dear friends,
The Cyprus
problem exists since the beginning of the 1960's; I would say even earlier.
However, the terrible tragedy in 1974 greatly exacerbated the situation. The
fascist coup de etat of the 15th of July 1974, which was carried out by the
Athens junta dictatorship and EOKA B' of Grivas, gave the signal and
represented the pretext for the Turkish invasion and occupation which exists
up till today.
The
consequences of the invasion were frightening. The occupied areas constitute
37% of the total territory of the Republic of Cyprus. Around 40,000 Turkish
troops are situated there in an offensive military formation with their
leadership striving to control the Turkish Cypriot community. Over 160,000
Greek Cypriots were forcibly expelled from their homes and properties,
whilst 40,000 Turkish Cypriots were forcibly transported to the northern
part of the island.
Contemporary
International Law does not accept any justification for such type of
aggressive actions. The claim made by Turkey that allegedly the 1960 Treaty
of Guarantee gives it the right of military intervention in the island is
legally unconvincing. Nowhere is this mentioned at all in the Treaty. And
even if such a reference were to be mentioned it would not have any legal
basis and validity because the Charter of the United Nations, which
overrules any other international agreement, allows military interventions
in states only after a relative decision of the Security Council. The very
important resolution 3314 of the 29th General Assembly of the UN
characteristically states that "the first use of military violence by one
state constitutes in violation of the UN Charter at first instance proof of
an aggressive action (aggression)". It also states that: "no argument
of any nature, political, economic, military or other, cannot represent a
justification of the aggressive action". The same resolution states that
"no territorial possession or particular advantage, which is gained as a
result of an aggressive action, is not and cannot be considered as legal".
Despite
however the fact that according to International Law we could have insisted
on the return to the situation which existed before, we are fully aware of
the fact that the Cyprus problem is a political problem and its solution
demands political compromise. Hence, immediately after the invasion, AKEL
had the political courage to declare that the solution of federation should
be accepted. Although neither the size of the island, nor the historical
reality rendered this choice as ideal, the situation that had been
formulated after the coup and the invasion imposed the federal settlement as
the historical compromise between the two communities. Thus we reached the
High - Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 which provided for a bi-zonal
bi-communal federal solution. They also provided for the demilitarisation of
the Island, the return of Famagusta to its lawful inhabitants irrespective
of the overall progress and other references. Once again AKEL first, through
a decision of its Central Committee, accepted the political equality of the
two communities also defining its content and substance, which consequently
was adopted also by a relative resolution of the Security Council: Equality
of two communities (and not of "two peoples" or/and two states as the
Turkish Cypriot leadership under Mr. Denktash demanded) which does not
entail numerical equality but effective participation of both communities in
the bodies and decisions of the federal state , as well as equal
jurisdictions and powers of the two federal constituents.
This year
thirty years have passed since the first High - Level agreement and the
Cyprus problem continues to remain unsolved. This is so despite the repeated
efforts and negotiations through many years and the periodic plans which the
UN had submitted within the framework of the good services of the UN
Secretary General. Tens of resolutions of the Security Council since 1974
have still not been implemented. Each objective observer can with ease
ascertain that the obstacle to the solution all of these years was the
intransigent stand of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side under the
leadership of Rauf Denktash.
In reality the
former leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community never accepted the
essence of the High Level Agreements which is the federal solution. Its
constant positions regarding "two peoples" with the separate right for
self-determination, for separate sovereignty and international personality,
for an overall exchange of properties and the essential prohibition of the
rights of acquiring property and settlement for Greek Cypriots in the area
under Turkish Cypriot administration etc prove without any shadow of a doubt
that its goal was not federation but confederation, which as is well known
means two separate states. This position was declared officially by Rauf
Denktash in August 1997.
Thus, from the
moment the Greek Cypriot side all of these years strove for a solution with
one state, with a single sovereignty, international personality and
nationality as the many Security Council resolutions provide for, whilst the
Turkish Cypriot side aimed at a solution of two separate states, it was
inevitable that the achievement of an agreement was impossible.
This state of
affairs began to change as the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the
European Union approached. Since the end of 1999, after a long period of
impasse which was also due the now official line of the Turkish side in
favour of confederation, a new effort began which concluded in the separate
referenda of the 24th of April 2004 with the well known result.
I take this
opportunity to repeat that the "No" vote of AKEL and of the overwhelming
majority of the Greek Cypriots in the referendum did not constitute a "No"
to the compromise solution of the Cyprus problem. We continue to support
unwaveringly the solution of a bi-zonal bi-communal federation as the High
Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 precisely provide for. The negative result
of the referendum therefore cannot and must not be interpreted neither as an
acceptance of the partitionist status quo neither as the pursuit of a
solution outside the parameters of the High Level Agreements. The real
dilemma is between bi-zonal bi-communal federation and that of partition.
AKEL without any hesitation chooses federation. We do not believe that the
peaceful and harmonious symbiosis of the two communities in a common state
is impossible.
We should
search elsewhere for the reasons of the "No" vote in the referendum of 2004.
Our assessment is that the Annan Plan contained a series of negative
elements, some of which constituted a source of considerable concern for the
Greek Cypriots. I want from the very beginning to reassure you that our goal
is not the removal of rights, even of privileges I would say the Annan Plan
conceded to our Turkish Cypriot compatriots. The political equality of the
two communities, as this has been defined in the relative resolutions of the
Security Council, is for AKEL a given fact. For us the obvious
disproportionate participation of the Turkish Cypriot community in relation
to the population balances in all the bodies and decisions of the federal
state does not constitute an obstacle. Nor does the fact that without the
consent of both communities a number of important decisions cannot be taken
constitute an obstacle. Nor does the fact that the federation will be made
up of two equal constituent states with wide-ranging functions and
jurisdictions disturb us. Our fundamental concerns are focused elsewhere.
The Annan Plan
had left a huge number of settlers remaining in Cyprus, greater than the
number of Turkish Cypriots themselves. This is of great concern to every
Greek Cypriot. We accept that there are humanitarian cases and as such we do
not insist on the strict implementation of the relative rules of
International Law, which considers colonization as an act of war and demands
the withdrawal of all settlers. We are ready to discuss the issue of a
reasonable amount of settlers remaining on the island after the
comprehensive settlement. We are not however ready to discuss the provisions
of the Annan Plan which would leave us with more settlers than the total
Turkish Cypriot population. This would constitute a dramatic change /
falsification in the historically formed demographic structure on the island
and of course it would have given an unfair advantage that would have
affected the very content of the solution itself. I venture to say that the
issue of the settlers on its own represents a sufficient explanation for the
negative vote of the Greek Cypriots in the referendum.
Another
serious source of concern for the Greek Cypriots is the notorious question
of the rights of intervention. As you will recognise of course the nightmare
of 1974 hangs over every Greek Cypriot and no one wants to risk its
repetition. Some guarantees are needed so that a tragedy of this scale will
not be repeated. This crucial issue in fact was not cleared up in the Annan
Plan and given that the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 would continue to be in
force even after the solution, the Greek Cypriots are justifiably concerned.
The experience of 1974 is fresh in the memories and does not allow us to
feel secure when such vagueness exists.
Also, an
extremely long timetable is set for the withdrawal of the troops, whilst in
the end not all the troops will be withdrawn. The timetables for the return
of even all those who would in the end are able to return to their homes and
properties in order to take back only one third of their properties are also
inexcusably long. Many refugees will never be able to return, since there
are limits and there are so many exemptions which represent the rule rather
than the exception.
Apart from
this the property issue is also real and substantial, as well as the general
question concerning security and especially the safeguarding that the
solution will be implemented. The question of a united economy is also
vital and substantial.
Bearing in
mind the above mentioned and other factors, AKEL had no doubt at all that
the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots would reject the Annan Plan
as it was presented without any changes. That is why we were calling
insistently for a postponement of the referenda for a few months. We wanted
the postponement in order to make improvements to the proposed solution so
that it could also be accepted by the majority of the Greek Cypriots.
Unfortunately our voice was not heard and as a consequence the Greek
Cypriots, by an overwhelming majority, rejected the Annan Plan.
I repeat that
we do not have any illusions and we are fully aware that the historical
compromise also demands the acceptance of unfair elements not to our liking.
However, I believe that all that I have characteristically referred to
beforehand should convince every well-intentioned person that there are
justified concerns also of Greek Cypriots which if they are not taken into
account then we will not be able for all of us to reach the much desired
comprehensive settlement.
After the
referendum of 2004 an intense negative climate was created on the Island.
For a long period of time a numbness prevailed which did not allow any
action whatsoever from the United Nations. After persistent efforts by AKEL
and others a small light of hope managed to open up in 2006.
The agreement
of 8th July in 2006 defined a framework of principles and set in motion a
procedure for the achievement of the goal. AKEL had worked hard and in a
discreet manner for the achievement of this agreement and assesses that if
this agreement were to be utilised properly by everyone it will contribute
to the creation of the preconditions that could lead to the achievement of
an overall solution. We evaluate as particularly positive the connection of
the discussion of day - to - day matters with issues of substance, because
this will contribute to the preparation of the ground for the beginning of
meaningful negotiations between the leaders of the two communities within
the framework and under the aegis of the UN.
We especially
greet the commitment for the reunification of Cyprus on the basis of a
bi-zonal bi-communal federation and political equality as this is defined in
the relative resolutions of the Security Council, as well as the recognition
of the fact that the status quo is unacceptable and that its prolongation
would have negative consequences for both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek
Cypriots.
Unfortunately
however the Turkish Cypriot side states, now even officially, that it wants
to disengage itself from the 8th of July agreement. This would lead to a new
lengthy stalemate because the agreement in question is the only process
available at this moment in order to move forward. We extend a call also
from this forum to the Turkish Cypriot leadership to have second thoughts
and respect what has been agreed upon because there is no other way to move
towards the creation of the preconditions for substantial talks. All that I
have mentioned above as issues which concern Greek Cypriots are issues not
only real and existing, but also issues on which the two communities have
different, if not totally opposite approaches. There is a gap. That is why
the gap must be bridged. This was also the goal of the 8th of July
agreement: to make the necessary preparatory work in order to bridge the gap
so that when a new effort will resume through official negotiations there
will be valid hopes that we will reach a solution.
How will this
preparatory stage last? No well-meaning person talks about years. We have
all realised that time is working against us. Consequently when we state our
support to the 8th of July agreement it does not mean that we want to let
time go by aimlessly and postpone the solution indefinitely, as the Turkish
side is claiming. We want to create the preconditions so that a new effort
can start which will conclude in an agreed solution. We trust that the
international community, and particularly the United Nations, the United
States and the European Union, will help in the overcoming of this
undesirable situation and that they can convince Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriot leadership that they should respect what has been agreed.
Apart from the
procedures for the beginning of discussions on the level of technical
committees, AKEL is also making other efforts. For a while now meetings are
taking place between representatives of AKEL and the Republican Turkish
Party because we believe that any convergence in the positions of the two
parties on fundamental aspects of the Cyprus problem would be helpful in the
effort for the resumption of negotiations aiming at a comprehensive
settlement. We will continue to make every possible effort for convergence
on as many issues as possible. We do not anyway forget that the relations of
the two parties have historical roots. When in the extremely aggravating
conditions created by the coup de etat, the invasion and occupation AKEL
formulated with courage and boldness the slogan "The Turkish Cypriots are
not our enemies - the Turkish Cypriots are our brothers!" we had as our main
partner in the struggle for rapprochement and unification the Republican
Turkish Party. AKEL from the very beginning attached particular importance
to rapprochement and the common struggle of Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots as the means for the achievement of a just, workable and viable
solution of the Cyprus problem. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are
children of the same mother earth. Together they shared joys and sorrows in
their common homeland. As AKEL we are proud because together with our
Turkish Cypriot progressive compatriots we waged common struggles for a
better tomorrow for the ordinary man and woman, for the working man and
woman. Together we fought so that a better future will dawn for our country
and people: Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.
The coup de
etat and the invasion of 1974 drove us apart - one from the other. In
difficult and very testing conditions we found the strength to overcome
obstacles and to come to an understanding with the progressive Turkish
Cypriots and especially with the Republican Turkish Party. The two parties
had come to an agreement that our common goal is a bi-zonal bi-communal
federation that will be expressed by an indivisible and demilitarised state
with a single sovereignty, a single international personality and
nationality. We agreed that the settlers who were transported illegally to
the island do not have a place in the new settlement; that the federation
will be composed of two equal constituent states with wide-ranging autonomy
and with both the community and human rights safeguarded, including the
right of the refugees to return. A basic principle that was agreed was that
the restoration and the implementation of the rights of one community should
not be to the detriment of the rights of the other community. The plan of
the UN that was proposed did not correspond to this principle. We hope that
the friends of the Republican Turkish Party and other progressive Turkish
Cypriots by understanding this fact will respond positively to our positions
and proposals, which do not affect collective or individual rights of our
Turkish Cypriot compatriots. We recognise that the conditions they are
working in are difficult and sometimes dangerous. We call on them to take
strength from our common past and for us together to lead the struggle for
the solution. We give them our hand and we promise them that we will always
be on their side in their efforts that will lead to the reunification of our
island and people.
At the same
time through the efforts for the implementation of the 8th of July agreement
the issue of the trade of the Turkish Cypriots is also on the agenda. The
position of AKEL, but also of the government, is in favour of the waging of
trade but not in a way which will lead to an upgrading of the pseudo-state
and the depreciation of the Republic of Cyprus. The government has submitted
concrete proposals towards this end and we hope that the issue will be
solved in a consensus way.
Dear friends,
My
introduction would not have been complete if I would not have also referred
to the European perspective of Turkey, given the impact of this long and
thorny course has on the Cyprus problem. I want therefore to make our
position clear for the umpteenth time that as AKEL we support the prospect
of Turkey's accession and we have more reasons than anybody else to want the
neighbouring country in the European Union and not outside of it. However,
Turkey must respect and implement the obligations deriving from this course,
including its obligations towards Cyprus.
In the past
few days we are following with particular concern the developments taking
place in Turkey. The confrontation developing between the leadership of the
armed forces but also parties and trade union organisations who disagree
with the political choices of the country on the one hand, and the Erdogan
government on the other, might lead the country to regression. Any
regression will have huge negative consequences on many aspects of Turkish
society. The most negative consequences however will be felt on the Cyprus
problem.
We address a
call to the UN and especially to the members of the Security Council to
exercise their influence so that there is respect to democratic values and
principles. The European Union, which Turkey has submitted an application to
join, can and must play its own positive role in this effort.
In conclusion,
I want to reassure you once more that AKEL remains unwaveringly dedicated to
the cause of finding a speedy solution of the Cyprus problem as soon as
possible. Precisely within the framework of this common, I believe, pursuit,
I address a call to everyone to help the effort for the immediate beginning
of negotiations on the level of technical committees and working committees,
with discussion not only of day-to-day questions but also of core issues, so
that the ground can be prepared, the gap bridged and we can move on to
substantial talks under the aegis and within the framework of the UN aiming
at a comprehensive settlement.
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